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Abstract 
This article is concerned with a doctrinal shift in the understanding of what 
amounts to an actionable communication of copyright works to the public. Recent 
rulings of the European Court of Justice hold that infringement takes place where a 
communication is addressed to a “new public”, i.e. a public that copyright holders 
had not taken into account when authorising the initial communication of the work. 
This newly developed doctrine develops a sui generis legal fiction that fundamentally 
changes the communication right; it both restricts and expands its scope in ways 
that were not foreseen when the right was first introduced in international law, 
European copyright law and the national laws of Member States. In its unnecessary 
complexity, the concept of the new public indicates that the extremely broad scope 
of the communication right is unworkable and counterproductive, thereby inviting 
a principle-based approach, according to which lawful and strictly private use ought 
to be exempt from infringement. 
 
Keywords 
copyright infringement, communication to the public, new public, hyperlinks, 
digital content, Svensson 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3047062 
	 2 
Introduction 
Digital content is one of the main drivers of digital economy growth. As the 
European Commission estimates in its 2015 Digital Single Market Strategy, 56% of 
European citizens use the internet for cultural purposes, with spending on digital 
entertainment and media likely to see double digit growth rates in the next five 
years.1 With the increasing importance of access to digital content on business 
growth, electronic commerce and social welfare, a growing number of referrals 
have been brought before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) regarding the scope 
of the right of communicating copyright works to the public.  
Enacted in the European Union by article 3 of the Information Society Directive2 
in implementation of the 1996 WIPO Treaties, the right of communication to the 
public is the prevalent form of legal protection afforded to authors and other rights 
owners for the online dissemination of their works. According to article 3(1):  
“Member States shall provide authors with the exclusive right to authorise or 
prohibit any communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless 
means, including the making available to the public of their works in such a 
way that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them.” 
																																								 																				
1 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Digital 
Single Market Strategy for Europe, Brussels, 6.5.2015, COM(2015) 192 final, at 2.4. 
2  Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 
on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, OJ L 
167/10, 22.6.2001. 
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On the basis of the wording of this provision, any unauthorised act of 
communication or making available to the public amounts to infringement. In the 
digital context, however, the problem arises when third parties subsequently 
retransmit a work that has been initially communicated by the rightholders. For 
instance, content made available on a website may then be made accessible from 
another website, or via an email communication that includes a web link; a video 
uploaded on a hosting platform may be incorporated in other web pages; a 
broadcast signal may be extended from the point of reception to other points, from 
the air to the internet, or from one website to another, again, via hyperlinking. Do 
all these situations, which are essential for the functioning of interactive media and 
the internet, fall within the scope of the right to communicate works to the public?  
When examining cases of such unauthorised retransmission of an initial 
communication to the public, the ECJ has found that infringement can be 
established where there is an unauthorised act of communication and that 
communication is addressed to a “new public”, i.e. an audience that was not taken 
into account by the rightholders when authorising the initial communication of the 
work. This newly elaborated concept3 introduces a multidimensional qualitative 
assessment in copyright infringement cases. The test for infringement does not rest 
on the public/private distinction, which traditionally served as the leading 
determinant of the scope of rights; rather, it relies on considerations over the 
rightholder’s legitimate interests in the commercial exploitation of the work, 
including the profit or not-for-profit nature of the subsequent communication of 
the work. The new public is therefore a sui generis legal fiction, which cannot be 
																																								 																				
3 Most recently affirmed by the Grand Chamber on 31 May 2016 in Reha Training Gesellschaft für Sport- 
und Unfallrehabilitation mbH v Gesellschaft für musikalische Aufführungs- und mechanische Vervielfältigungsrechte 
(GEMA) (C‑117/15) EU:C:2016:379. 
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understood by reference to other areas of law,4 even within the contours of 
intellectual property law, 5  and does not coincide with a commonsensical 
interpretation of the public. For instance, a hotel room that accommodates a couple 
of residents at a time qualifies as a private place for the purposes of fundamental 
rights protection, such as privacy, but those residing in it at a given time are 
considered to be a public audience when a broadcast signal is transmitted in the 
room.6 At the same time, while one would assume that internet users are, abstractly 
put, members of the public at large, placing hyperlinks on the internet – that would 
be accessible in principle to anyone in the world – may not amount to infringement 
where the content is placed freely available online with the consent of the 
rightholders.7 
This article is concerned with the impact of the newly developed doctrine of the 
new public on the appropriate scope of the communication right and, thereinafter, 
on copyright infringement. The development of the new public requirement 
																																								 																				
4 The concept of the public shifts through time and across various areas of law. Its definition rests 
heavily on the relevant context. In human rights and data protection, for instance, the public/private 
distinction is drawn by privacy or confidentiality considerations. 
5 For instance, the concept of the public in copyright law and trade mark law may be taken to 
fundamentally differ: a critical factor in copyright is whether or not the public has received the work; in 
trade mark law, however, considerations include how the public is likely to perceive a sign. While in both 
cases the public is used to assess the scope of the right, in trade mark disputes the court is often 
required to use the relevant public in a higher state of abstraction, i.e. as a benchmark in its assessment 
of validity and/or infringement (see, e.g.: the absolute prohibition against descriptive signs, on the 
basis that they are incapable of fulfilling the essential function of a trade mark as an indication of 
origin, found in art. 7(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) 207/2009 on the Community trade mark, 
which is a factual question requiring the determination of whether the average consumer would 
perceive the sign as a description of the central characteristics of the goods or services applied for; 
and, infringement on the basis of a likelihood of confusion, found in arts. 9(1)(b), where the court 
carries out its assessment according to the perception of the relevant “public”, which is taken to be 
the reasonably well-informed, circumspect and observant average consumer of the goods or services 
at issue). 
6  Sociedad General de Auditores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SL (C-306/05) 
EU:C:2006:764; Organismos Sillogikis Diacheirisis Dimiourgon Theatrikon kai Optikoakoustikon Ergon v Divani 
Akropolis (C-136/09) EU:C:2010:151 (Order of the Court); Phonographic Performance (Ireland) Ltd v Ireland 
and Attorney General (C-162/10) EU:C:2012:141. 
7 See e.g. Nils Svensson and Others v Retriever Sverige AB (C-466/12), EU:C:2014:76. 
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changes the scope of the right by introducing – in certain limited instances, such as 
hyperlinking and framing – a waiver erga omnes. Although it has been argued that 
this can be seen as the unacceptable introduction of copyright exhaustion, which is 
not statutorily available by reference to the communication right,8 this article argues 
that the new public requirement can be read as developing an implied license 
argument.  
I first discuss the legal nature of the copyright public as an inherent limitation to 
the scope of rights. I then move on to the recent shift in the conventional 
understanding of the communication right and the way in which the ECJ has raised 
the new public into an express prerequisite of infringement, indicating that the 
complexity in reaching certain outcomes challenges the credibility of copyright law 
and the sensible expectation of copyright users for clear, simple rules. In exploring 
how this doctrinal interpretation has impacted on the scope of infringement, I 
elaborate on the instances in which the new public can be read as introducing an 
implied license. Finally, I identify the categories of users that are likely to be a new 
public and those that cannot qualify as such from a principle-based perspective.  
The “public” as an inherent limitation to the scope of rights: statutory 
language and beyond 
Most rights in copyright law are addressed to the public, even indirectly. The Berne 
Convention, for instance, recognises the rights of ‘public performance’, of 
																																								 																				
8 See art 3(3) of Directive 2001/29/EC; see also Association littéraire et artistique internationale 
(ALAI) Opinion on the criterion “New Public”, developed by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU), put in the context of making available and communication to the public, adopted on 
17 September 2014, at 9 et seq.; and, J. Rosén, ‘Chapter 12: How Much Communication to the Public 
Is 'Communication to the Public'?’ in I. A. Stamatoudi, New Developments in EU and International 
Copyright Law, Info Law Series, Volume 35 (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International: 2016) 331 
– 350. 
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‘communication to the public’ and of ‘public recitation’.9 Articles 6(1) and 8 of the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) provide for the right of making a work available to 
the public. Articles 10 and 14 of the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 
(WPPT) confer to performers and producers of phonograms respectively a right of 
making available their subject-matter to the public and article 15 of the same Treaty 
makes reference to a right of communicating the relevant subject-matter to the 
public. In a similar vein, the Information Society Directive provides a right of 
communicating works or, otherwise, making them available to the public10 and a 
right of distribution to the public.11  
Yet the meaning of the phrase “to the public” in copyright law is nowhere defined 
positively. Legislation explanatory documents instead offer negative definitions in 
that the private circle — being comprised of members of the immediate family and 
close social acquaintances — is excluded from its scope.12 On the basis of this 
public/private distinction, certain activities will be legally significant once they reach 
the general public, but they are less likely to trigger infringement when they take 
place within a private circle. For instance, giving a copy of a work to a family 
member does not amount to distribution or rental.  
																																								 																				
9 See arts 11, 11bis, 11ter and 14; see also art 11, TRIPs Agreement. 
10 Art 3. 
11 Art 4. 
12 See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Paper on the 
review of the EC legal framework in the field of copyright and related rights, SEC(2004) 995, 19 July 
2004, 15: “the immediate family circle and the closest social acquaintances” are not meant to be part 
of the public. See also, Rafael Hoteles (C-306/05) at [41]. 
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Defining the private sphere in this context is a matter of doctrinal interpretation 
and many fact-specific parameters are factored in the test, 13 even though the public 
is the essential constituent of the scope of the right.  
That the concept of the public has remained elusive is largely to do with the fact 
that its definition tends to shrink or expand depending on the context.14 The 
number of the individuals involved is only indicative, there being an abstract 
assumption that the public “implies a fairly large number of persons”.15 Legal 
classification is guided by contextual variables, as national case law and the ECJ 
rulings indicate.16 These can include the relationship of the person/entity initiating 
the communication to the rightholder, or their relationship to the receiving 
audience.17 Moreover, the way in which the public is defined does not depend on 
the rights that are possibly infringed,18 even though the particularities of each mode 
of exploitation may be taken into account. Performance requires an element of 
spatial presence of the audience whereas electronic communication may be received 
from a place and at a time individually chosen by the rightholders. The copyright 
																																								 																				
13 S. Karapapa, Private Copying (London: Routledge, 2012), 49 et seq. 
14 ALAI, “Report and Opinion on the Making available and communication to the public in the 
internet environment: focus on linking techniques on the internet” (2014) 36(3) EIPR, 149-154, 152. 
15 Società Consortile Fonografici (SCF) v Marco Del Corso (C‑135/10) EU:C:2012:140 at [84]. See also 
Mediakabel BV v Commissariaat voor de Media, Case (C‑89/04) EU:C:2005:348 at [30]; Lagardère Active 
Broadcast, v Société pour la perception de la rémunération équitable (SPRE) et al. (C-192/04) EU:C:2005:475 at 
[31]; and, Rafael Hoteles (C-306/05) at [37] and [38]. 
16 See, e.g., Società Consortile Fonografici (SCF) v Marco Del Corso (C‑135/10); Teosto v A Taxi Driver [2004] 
ECDR 3 (Finland) (where taxi clientele was found to be a public circle of recipients); Sabab v British 
Car Center, A&M 2006 (Belgium) (where the Belgian Supreme Court ruled that a group of four 
colleagues working together on a daily basis in a workplace accessible only to them is a private circle); 
Court of Appeal, 20 November 2007, Case 7196/2007 (Greece) (where the Greek Court of Appeal 
found that communication within the family or immediate social circle of the user is not public); 
Court of Appeal Aix-en-Provence, 5 September 2007, Case No 2007/501 (France) (where the Court 
of Appeal found that the private circle can consist only of family). 
17 See, e.g., Performing Rights Society v Rangers FC Supporters Club [1974] SC 49, (UK). 
18 M.M. Walter and S. Von Lewinski, European Copyright Law: A Commentary (Oxford: OUP, 2010) at 
11.3.46. 
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public is hence a legal fiction, largely shaped by qualitative criteria and economic 
considerations. 
The copyright monopoly going public 
The concept of the public as an inherent constituent of rights was discussed in the 
English Courts over a century ago.19 For the purposes of public performances, an 
audience qualified as public where the relevant activity could whittle down the 
rightholders’ statutory monopoly. I have elsewhere referred to this argument as the 
“monopoly” test,20 due to its particular focus on considerations regarding the 
exploitation of the works. Most cases heard in the United Kingdom involved public 
performances: in Ernest Turner,21 the performance of music in a factory before 600 
employees was held to be infringement for the purposes of the Copyright Act.22 
Lord Greene opined that the “statutory monopoly” granted under copyright law 
would be largely destroyed if such performances were to be permitted, as 
rightholders would likely consider this audience to form part of the public. In Duck 
v Bates,23 however, the performance of a dramatic piece in a hospital room before 
170 nurses, attendants and other hospital workers free of admission charge was not 
found to be infringement. This was because the hospital was not a place for public 
entertainment and the performance would hence not harm the rightholder.  
The heart of the principle rests on exploitation, and a performance is more likely to 
amount to infringement when it impacts on the copyright “monopoly”. As 
																																								 																				
19 See, e.g., Duck v Bates (1883-84) L.R. 13 QBD 843, (UK).  
20 S. Karapapa, Private Copying (London: Routledge, 2012), 68. 
21 Ernest Turner Electrical Instruments v Performing Right Society [1943] Ch. 167, 172-173, (UK); Jennings v 
Stephens [1936] Ch. 469, (UK); Performing Rights Society v Rangers FC Supporters Club [1974] SC 49, (UK). 
22 UK Copyright Act 1911, ss. 1(2) and 2(3). 
23 Duck v Bates (1883-84) L.R. 13 QBD 843, (UK). 
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indicated in the Rangers case, at a birthday party the “use of a copyright work is not 
rebounding to the financial disadvantage of the owner of the copyright, since the 
selected audience is not employing the work under conditions in which they would 
normally pay for the privilege in one form or another.”24 This marks a direct link 
between the copyright public and economic considerations, inherent in the 
exploitative nature of performance rights.  
A similar principle to the one underpinning the “monopoly test” has been 
developed by the ECJ in a number of recent judgments by reference to the 
communication right. With its recent case-law, the ECJ has given meaning to the 
concept of the “public”, which features in the statutory language of article 3 of the 
Information Society Directive, and doctrinally transformed it into a new public, 
namely a central prerequisite for the application of the communication right.25 The 
requirement of the “new public” marks a shift in the conventional understanding of 
copyright infringement as it stems from an extensive interpretation of the Berne 
Convention:26 prior to the ECJ decisions, it was assumed that any unauthorised 
communication of works to the public amounts to infringement. It was not clear 
whether an unauthorised communication that reaches the same audience of the 
original communication amounts to infringement or not. As has now been clarified, 
																																								 																				
24 Performing Rights Society v Rangers FC Supporters Club [1974] SC 49, (UK), at 59. 
25 Certain national Courts have already started applying the “new public” test. See, indicatively, 
Paramount Home Entertainment International Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 3479 (Ch), 
(UK). An interesting case that upholds the principle but not the full analysis of the new public 
criterion is Ultrasoft Technologies Ltd v Hubcreate Ltd [2016] EWHC 544 (IPEC), (UK). 
26 See art 11bis(1)(i), Berne Convention. See also E. Arezzo, ‘Hyperlinks and making available right in 
the European Union – what future for the Internet after Svensson?’ (2014) 45(5) IIC 524-555, 534; 
and, ALAI Opinion of 17 September 2014. 
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it is only when the subsequent communication reaches a new public that 
infringement can take place.27  
The new public as an express requirement for infringement: from Rafael  to 
Svensson  
The judicial trend started developing in Rafael Hoteles, back in 2006. The few 
referrals preceding this case dealt with satellite broadcasting in the context of 
Directive 93/83/EEC. Although these cases addressed the concept of public 
communication and the relevant broadcasting rights, it was not until Rafael that the 
concept of the public started gaining momentum in the determination of 
infringement at EU level. This was one of the first cases on the newly introduced 
public communication right under article 3 of the Information Society Directive28 
and the referring Court, the Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona, sought clarification 
on what the public is in the context of a communication to the public. Requesting 
insights as to whether installing TV sets in hotel rooms is included within the scope 
of this right, the questions expressly addressed the concept of the copyright public: 
does the fact that a hotel room is deemed to be a strictly domestic location mean 
that there is no communication to the public; and, does the fact that successive 
viewers have access to the work mean that a communication effected through a 
television set inside a hotel bedroom be regarded as public? 
Successive publicity 
																																								 																				
27 Svensson at [24]. 
28 Before Rafael, the ECJ discussed the public communication right in two other cases, where it found 
that the term “public” refers to an indeterminate number of potential television viewers. See 
Mediakabel (C‑89/04) at [30]; and, Lagardère Active Broadcast (C-192/04) at [31].  
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Taking off from the interpretational guidance offered in recital 23 of the 
Information Society Directive, according to which “communication to the public” 
must be interpreted broadly, 29  the Court adopted a correspondingly “general 
approach”,30 taking into account customers that are present in hotel premises in a 
broad sense, i.e. not only customers residing in hotel rooms, and the fact that such 
customers tend to quickly succeed each other. This meant that “a fairly large 
number of persons are involved” that could qualify as a public for the purposes of 
article 3.31  
This consideration on its own, however, did not make the test. Economic 
parameters were also taken into account. Taken separately, the residents of hotel 
rooms, that usually cannot exceed two people per room at a time, are of limited 
economic significance. It is the cumulative effect of making content available to 
hotel clientele that matters, especially because the initiation of the transmission is 
made by a broadcasting organisation other than the original one.32 “Thus, such a 
transmission is made to a public different from the public at which the original act 
of communication of the work is directed, that is, to a new public,” the Court 
concluded.33  
Instead of focusing on the specific attributes that a group of persons should 
possess to qualify as a public audience, the emphasis was placed on the effects of an 
unauthorised communication on exploitation. It was only noted that, according to 
																																								 																				
29 Rafael Hoteles (C-306/05) at [36]. 
30 Ibid at [37]. 
31 Ibid at [38]; affirmed in Mediakabel (C-89/04) 
32 See, e.g., art 11bis(1)(ii), Berne Convention, referred to in both Rafael and FAPL.   
33 Rafael at [40], emphasis added. See contra Svensson (where the fact that a communication is initiated 
by an organisation other than the original one did not by default mean that the communication is 
addressed to a new public). Regarding the word “thus”, it has arguably been criticised as a non sequitur; 
see ALAI Opinion, 17 September 2014 at 11. 
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the Guide to the Berne Convention, an interpretative document drawn up by the 
WIPO in 1978, the public that the rightholders have in mind when authorising a 
broadcast is only “direct users, that is, the owners of reception equipment who, 
either personally or within their own private or family circles, receive the 
programme”.34  
“According to the Guide, if reception is for a larger audience, possibly for profit, a 
new section of the receiving public hears or sees the work and the communication of the 
programme via a loudspeaker or analogous instrument no longer constitutes simple 
reception of the programme itself but is an independent act through which the broadcast 
work is communicated to a new public.”35 
Elaborating on the specific parameters of the communication, the Court further 
indicated that the absence of an intervention, through the provision of television 
sets, would mean that hotel customers would not be able to enjoy the broadcast 
work.36 What matters, therefore, is that the public is offered a possibility to access the 
work,37 irrespective of whether they actually access it or not. This places the 
emphasis on the “enabling role” of the communication,38 which may be offered as 
an additional service with the aim of obtaining some benefit.39  
																																								 																				
34 Guide to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Geneva: WIPO, 
1978), at 69; Rafael, above, at [40]. See in this regard the criticism expressed in ALAI, Opinion of 17 
September 2014, 16 et seq (stressing that the WIPO issued a newer version of the Guide in 2003, and, 
secondly, the old Guide considers retransmissions by loudspeakers). 
35 Rafael at [41] (emphasis added). 
36 Ibid at [42]. 
37 Ibid at [43], emphasis added. 
38 ALAI, “Report and opinion on the making available and communication to the public in the 
internet environment: focus on linking techniques on the internet” (2014) 36(3) EIPR 149-154 at 152. 
39 This is empirically proven by the fact that hotels can charge more for rooms with TV facilities (or, 
the other way round, that hotel guests are willing to pay more for a room with TV). 
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The emphasis in Rafael Hoteles was primarily put on the meaning of communication 
as an act of exploitation and less so on the concept of the public. Three years later, 
when the Divani Acropolis order was issued,40 this approach did not change and it 
was also held that hotel clientele is a new public. The same position was repeated in 
2012, in Phonographic Performance.41 Although facts slightly differ, the issue remains 
the same: is the provision of television and/or radio sets in hotel rooms an act of 
communication to the public? The Court here stabilised its approach into three 
main criteria, which have thereinafter become the doctrinal basis of assessing 
infringement of the communication right. First, there is an act of communication 
and the hotel operator has a central role in broadcasting of the protected subject-
matter. Secondly, a potentially broad, and largely undetermined, number of people 
visit hotels and gain access to these broadcasts. This means that there is a 
communication addressed to a new public. Finally, broadcasting has a lucrative 
purpose: hotel clients choose to access the broadcasts and pay to gain access. On 
the basis of these conditions, the Court found that there is public communication 
for which equitable remuneration should be paid to the relevant rightholders. 
The new public as an additional audience reached through a deliberate intervention 
Although the new public was first discussed in Rafael Hoteles, it was not until FA 
Premier League that it was raised into an express requirement for infringement.42 It 
was explained that when authors authorise a broadcast of their works, they take 
into account solely the owners of TV sets who, either personally or within their 
																																								 																				
40 Divani Acropolis (C-136/09). 
41 Phonographic Performance Ltd (C-162/10). 
42 Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others and Karen Murphy v Media 
Protection Services Ltd (FAPL), joined cases (C-403/08) and (C-429/08) EU:C:2011:43 at [197]. An 
interesting discussion of this case is offered in T. Aplin, ‘‘Reproduction’ and ‘communication to the 
public’: rights in EU copyright law: FAPL v QC Leisure’ 2011 22(2) KLJ, 209-219. 
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own private or family circles, receive the signal and follow the broadcasts. Any set 
of users outside this circle is likely to be a new public. The case involved the 
broadcasting of football matches in a pub through the use of foreign decoding 
devices. Although the foreign devices were imported at a cheaper rate from Greece 
to the UK, and were used, in disregard of the broadcasters’ will, outside the 
geographical area for which they had been issued, their importation was not found 
to be unlawful under article 56 TFEU. At the same time, because in FA Premier 
League it was the pub owner who transmitted works to its customers, those 
customers were found to be an additional public, which was not taken into account 
by the rightholders when authorising the broadcasting of their works.43 The Court 
further stressed that “it is not irrelevant that a ‘communication’ within the meaning 
of article 3(1) of the Information Society Directive is of a profit-making nature”.44 
This is because the transmission is liable to attract customers in the pub and it 
hence impacts on the number of customers in a way that generates financial profit 
for its owner.45 
 
It was only nine days after the FA Premier League case that the requirement that 
there ought to be a new public was repeated and expressly upheld. In Airfield v 
SABAM, and a parallel action involving Agicoa,46 the ECJ decided that satellite 
platform operators may need to seek authorisation from rightholders to offer their 
																																								 																				
43 FA Premier League at [199]. 
44 Ibid at [204]. See also Rafael Hoteles at [44]. 
45 FA Premier League at [205]. 
46 Airfield NV and Canal Digitaal BV v Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA 
(SABAM) and Airfield NV v Agicoa Belgium BVBA, joined cases (C-431/09) and (C-432/09) 
EU:C:2011:648 . Although this judgment is in line with Rafael and FAPL, its implications are broader 
in the sense that it created the need for platform operators and also other programme aggregators to 
review their licensing agreements with content suppliers and collecting societies. 
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customers access to broadcast channels, since such an access is a separate act of 
communication to the public. Authorisation is required,47 unless the rightholders 
have agreed with the broadcasters that protected works will also be communicated 
to the public through that provider “on condition, in the latter situation, that the 
providers’ intervention does not make those works accessible to a new public.”48 
The customers of the platform are likely to be a new public, i.e. a wider audience 
than that targeted by the original broadcaster. Recital 17 of Directive 93/83 
indicates that the rightholders must be ensured an appropriate remuneration for 
communications to the public by satellite. 49  There is no need to obtain 
authorisation in cases involving limited intervention, such as the mere provision of 
physical facilities for enabling or making the communication.50 The latter form of 
intervention, however, is not to be confused with the provision of devices that 
would allow decoding the encrypted communication: this constitutes an 
intervention without which the subscribers would not be able to enjoy the works 
broadcast, although physically within the caching area.51 Those subscribers form 
part of the public targeted by the satellite package provider itself. By its 
intervention, the operator makes the protected works accessible to a public, which 
is additional to the public targeted by the broadcasting organisation.52  
																																								 																				
47 According to art 2, Directive 93/83 copyright holders must authorise any communication of the 
protected works to the public by satellite. 
48 Airfield at [83] and [84]. 
49 This takes account of all aspects of the broadcast, including its actual and its potential audience. See 
Airfield at [73]; See also FA Premier League at [108] and [110]. 
50 Airfield at [74]. 
51 Ibid at [79]: the provision of facilities ensuring or improving reception of the original broadcast in its 
catchment area does not require previous authorisation from the rightholders concerned. 
52 This is consistent with another, parallel judicial trend, whereby internet broadcasting is treated as 
different from “conventional” TV broadcasting (air, satellite, cable). See M. Borghi, ‘Chasing copyright 
infringement in the streaming landscape’ (2011) 42(3) IIC 316 et seq. 
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Another issue of critical importance was the profit-making purpose of the 
communication. An autonomous service was provided because the subscription fee 
was payable with a view to access the satellite communication rather than merely 
benefit from a technical service.53 This autonomous service did not simply enable 
access to the communication of a single broadcasting organisation, but brought 
together a number of channels from various organisations in a new audiovisual 
product, with the satellite package provider deciding upon the composition of the 
package thereby created. The satellite package provider thus expanded the circle of 
persons having access to the television programmes and offered access to the 
protected works to a new public.54 
Same technical means 
In the aforementioned cases, the ECJ examined situations where an operator had 
deliberately offered access to broadcasts containing protected works to a new 
public. What about making terrestrial broadcasts available online? In ITV, the 
proceedings concerned the transmission of works included in a terrestrial broadcast 
and their making available over the internet. Because these two acts must be 
authorised individually and separately from the relevant rightholders, there was no 
need to examine the requirement that there must be a new public. 55  The 
retransmission of the signal through an internet stream was technically distinct 
from the original communication, 56  and in this regard it was a new act of 
communication. It was immaterial whether the public reached would have been 
new or not as they gained access to a different mode of communication.  
																																								 																				
53 Airfield at [80]. 
54 Ibid at [81]. 
55 ITV v TV Catch Up Ltd (C‑607/11) EU:C:2013:147 at [39]. 
56 See M. Borghi, (2011) 42(3) IIC 316 et seq. 
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The ITV case is important as it frames the contours of the new public requirement, 
which is to be taken into consideration only where the retransmission takes place 
through the same technical means and is thereinafter subject to a single act of 
authorisation. With the emphasis on the mode of the transmission, the ITV case 
casts doubts as to the viability of the new public requirement as a determinant 
factor in deciding infringement of the communication right. 57  It is a satellite 
condition that stems from an expansive interpretation of the law. When, however, 
the transmission is not subject to a single act of authorisation and it has been 
initiated by the rightholders themselves without the implementation of an access 
restriction protocol, the new public requirement will become central – as in the case 
of hyperlinking and embedded links. 
When internet users are not a new public  
In Svensson,58 perhaps one of the most controversial recent copyright cases of the 
ECJ,59 the question was whether hyperlinks constitute an act of communication to 
the public within the meaning of article 3(1) of the Information Society Directive. 
The Court observed that there are two cumulative conditions that need to be met: 
first, there should be an act of communication; secondly, this communication 
should be addressed to a “public”.60  
With regards to the first condition, the Court took into account the broad construal 
that the communication right ought to ensure a high level of protection for 
																																								 																				
57 See, in this regard, ALAI, Opinion of 17 September 2014, 19 et seq. 
58 Svensson,at [26]-[28]. 
59 See, e.g., Pedro Malaquias, ‘Case C-466/12 Svensson – CJEU saves the internet’, Queen Mary Journal 
of Intellectual Property blog, available at https://qmjip.wordpress.com/2014/02/14/case-c-46612-
svensson-cjeu-saves-the-internet/ (accessed 31st October 2016); M. Burri, ‘Permission to Link: Making 
Available via Hyperlinks in the European Union after Svensson’, JIPITEC, 2014, 245.  
60 Svensson at [16]. 
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copyright holders.61 There are only two paragraphs in Svensson addressing whether 
hyperlinking amounts to an act of communication,62 which is perhaps not the 
detailed discussion one would reasonably expect in the circumstances. Through an 
analogical application of Rafael Hoteles, communication was equated to making 
works available “to a public in such a way that the persons forming that public may 
access it, irrespective of whether they avail themselves of that opportunity”.63 This 
brief passage led to the conclusion that “the provision of clickable links to 
protected works must be considered to be ‘making available’ and, therefore, an ‘act 
of communication’”.64  
This preliminary conclusion is unworkable for two main reasons. First, Rafael 
Hoteles was premised on a substantially different factual background and mere 
reliance on analogy with no further analysis of the particularity of the act in 
question is problematic. Hyperlinks arguably do not amount to an act of 
communication, as their function is to merely signpost an electronic address.65 The 
new WIPO Guide indicates that transmission of content is an important 
constituent of the scope of right.66 By serving as “location tools”,67 hyperlinks do 
not involve such a “transmission”, as they simply redirect users to materials that are 
																																								 																				
61 See Svensson at [19], where reference was made to FA Premier League at [193] and recitals 4 and 9 of 
Directive 2001/29/EC. 
62 Svensson at [19]-[20]. 
63 Ibid at [19]. 
64 Ibid at [20]. 
65 European Copyright Society, Opinion on the Reference to the CJEU in Case C-466/12 Svensson, 
15 February 2013 at [35] et seq. 
66 See in this respect the new WIPO Guide, 2003, at 49; also see ITV at [23]. See also FA Premier 
League at [193]; OSA v Léčebné lázně Mariánské Lázně a.s. (C‑351/12) at [25]; Opinion of AG Bot in 
Reha Training Gesellschaft für Sport- und Unfallrehabilitation mbH v GEMA (C‑117/15) EU:C:2016:109 at 
[47]. 
67 European Copyright Society, Opinion on the Reference to the CJEU in Case C-466/12 Svensson, 
15 February 2013 at [40]. 
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already made available.68 In this light, Svensson deviates from the position that 
national Courts adopted on related questions.69  
Secondly, equating communication to an act of making works available by enabling 
access to them does not clarify the scope of the making available right. Sitting as a 
sub-unit of the communication right in article 3 of the Information Society 
Directive, the making available right has a seemingly distinct, yet oddly overlapping, 
scope. Indeed, by reference to the making available right, the new WIPO Guide 
indicates that “what is relevant is the first making available of the work to the 
public”.70 If this is the case, however, hyperlinks cannot amount to an act of making 
available, in that this requires placing materials for the first time on the internet, 
namely uploading them into an interactive transmission system – not merely 
redirecting users to materials that are already made available. As acknowledged in 
																																								 																				
68 Ibid at [9], et seq [35]-[40]. The Svensson principle also featured in the BestWater Order, a case 
involving embedded links, where the Court found (at [14]-[17]) that embedding, within one’s own 
website, of another person’s work made available to the public on a third-party website, through a link 
by use of the framing technique, does not by itself constitute communication to the public, insofar as 
the work concerned is neither directed to a new public nor communicated through specific technical 
means that differ from that used for the initial communication. (See also Innoweb/Wegener (C-202/12) 
EU:C:2013:850.) When BestWater was returned to the Bundesgerichtshof, the German Federal Supreme 
Court found that the link itself is not an act of publicly making available under German Copyright law, 
but an illegal public communication in the sense of art. 3 (1), Directive 2001/29/EC (“The Reality II”, 
BGH, I ZR 46/12, 9 July 2015). This might be due to the fact that the German Federal Court in an 
older decision held that linking does not amount to making available (Handelsblatt Publishers Group v 
Paperboy, [2005] ECDR 7; ZR 259/00 (Germany)). 
69 See Handelsblatt Publishers Group v Paperboy [2005] ECDR 7 (Germany); Napster.no (2006) IIC 120 (27 
January 2005) (Norway), at [44]-[47]; Sociedad General de Autores y Editores (SGAE) v Jesús Guerra 
Calderón, Case no. 67/10, Commercial Court No. 7 of Barcelona, 9 March 2010 (unreported) (Spain); 
Misdemeanous Court of Kilkis, 965/2010 (Greece); Home A/S v Ofir A/S, Maritime & Commercial 
Court (Sø-og Handelsretten), 1 February 2006, v-108-99 (Denmark); Bundesgerichtshof, 29 April 
2010, I ZR 69/08, aff’d in I ZR 140/10 of 19 October 2011 (Germany); Paramount Home Entertainment 
International Ltd, et al v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 3479 (Ch), at [37] (United Kingdom). 
70 On the making available right see the new WIPO Guide, 2003, at 49: “what is relevant is the first 
making available of the work to the public”; IFPI, “The WIPO Treaties: ‘Making Available’ Right”, 
March 2003, 1: “Implementing legislation should cover the initial act of putting a work or phonogram 
on an interactive network, as well as any subsequent transmissions”. 
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the draft report of the European Parliament,71 “the ability to freely link from one 
resource to another is one of the fundamental building blocks of the Internet”. It is 
on this basis that the report calls for a clarification “that reference to works by 
means of a hyperlink is not subject to exclusive rights, as it is does not consist in a 
communication to a new public”.72  
Without entering into a detailed analysis of the nature of the relevant rights, the 
Court in Svensson assumed that hyperlinks amount to an act of communication and 
moved on to assess whether this communication was directed to a new public. It 
held that when the retransmission of the same works as those covered by the initial 
communication takes place through the same technical means, it must be addressed 
to a new public to be infringing73:  
“the public targeted by the initial communication consisted of all potential 
visitors to the site concerned, since, given that access to the works on that site 
was not subject to any restrictive measures, all internet users could therefore 
have free access to them”.74  
This meant that the rightholders—by not applying access restriction protocols—
were assumed to have offered free access of the content to this public, comprised 
by “all internet users”. Simply put, there cannot be a new public for works that are 
freely available online. 
																																								 																				
71  European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs, Draft Report on the Implementation of 
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the Information Society, 15 January 
2015, 2014/2256(INI), point 15. See also in this regard Crookes v Newton [2011] SCC 47; [2011] SCR 
269, at [34] (Arabella J). 
72 Ibid. 
73 Svensson at [24]. 
74 Ibid at [26]. 
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An implied license reasoning? 
Svensson has become the subject of controversy at scholarly75 and policy level.76 The 
way in which the Court applied the new public condition in Svensson has been 
argued to introduce a “waiver erga omnes (or at least, as to all members of the 
intended public)”77 that has: 
 “the unfounded and illegitimate effect of exhaustion of the communication to 
the public right or, rather, the scope of that right is reduced by the court from 
the outset”.78  
Exhaustion is the legal principle according to which the rightholders’ control over 
any further distribution, sale, hiring, or loan of copies of works that have been 
placed on the market within the European Economic Area on their behalf or with 
their consent, e.g. by way of distribution to the public,79 is “exhausted”.80 The 
																																								 																				
75 See, e.g., M.J. Ficsor, ‘Svensson: honest attempt at establishing due balance concerning the use of 
hyperlinks – spoiled by the erroneous ‘new public’ theory’, 2015, available online at 
http://www.copyrightseesaw.net (accessed 31st October 2016); J. Rosén, ‘Chapter 12: How Much 
Communication to the Public Is 'Communication to the Public'?’ in I. A. Stamatoudi, New Developments 
in EU and International Copyright Law, Info Law Series, Volume 35 (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law 
International: 2016) 331 – 350; J. C. Ginsburg, ‘Hyperlinking and Infringement: The CJEU Decides 
(sort of)’, The Media Institute Blog Post, 17 March 2014, at 
http://www.mediainstitute.org/IPI/2014/031714. php (accessed 31st October 2016).  
 
76  European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs, Draft Report on the Implementation of 
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the Information Society, 15 January 
2015, 2014/2256(INI), at point 15. 
77 ALAI, Opinion of 17 September 2014, at 16. 
78 Ibid at 15-16. Also see in this respect M.J. Ficsor, ‘Svensson: honest attempt at establishing due 
balance concerning the use of hyperlinks – spoiled by the erroneous ‘new public’ theory’, 2015, 
available online at http://www.copyrightseesaw.net, at 1.2.3 (accessed 31st October 2016). 
79 See, e.g., Music-Vertrieb Membran v GEMA and K-Tel International v GEMA, Joined Cases (C 55/80 
and C 57/80) EU:C:1981:10; Deutsche Grammophon v Metro (C 78/70) EU:C:1971:59. 
80 Art 4(2) of the Information Society Directive; Laserdisken ApS v Kulturministeriet (C-479/04) at [21]. 
The American counterpart of copyright exhaustion is the “first-sale” doctrine (Copyright Act of 1976, 
17 USC §109). 
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Information Society Directive clearly states that exhaustion does not apply to 
electronic communications, even though there is no such express indication in the 
WIPO Treaties the Directive implements. 81  The important implication of this 
express exclusion is that the scope of the public communication right under the 
Directive, which in any case ought to be interpreted broadly,82 offers a very wide 
authorial entitlement, subject to the limitations expressly listed in article 5(3). This 
has become a source of controversy, not only because it creates a schism in the 
modalities of issuing hard and electronic copies to the public, but also because it 
does not make allowance for the creation of second-hand markets for digital goods, 
like those legally possible with regards to tangible copies. 83  
Although Usedsoft84 raised some expectations that exhaustion applies in the online 
context too, by affirming that the resale of used software online is legal, it was 
explicitly drafted as lex specialis, applicable only to software but not to digital content 
in general. Two recent decisions of German Courts affirmed this, by refusing to 
accept the applicability of this principle with regards to categories of content not 
																																								 																				
81 Art. 3(3) of the Information Society Directive. The signatory countries are left with the discretion to 
apply the principle of exhaustion “after the first sale or other transfer of ownership of the original or a 
copy of the work with the authorization of the author”. See also art 6 WCT and art 8 WPPT. 
82 Recital 23. 
83 See S. Karapapa, ‘Reconstructing copyright exhaustion in the online world’ (2014) 4 IPQ 304-322. 
84 Usedsoft GmbH v Oracle International Corp (C-128/11) EU:C:2012:407. See D. Naylor and E. Parris, 
‘After ReDigi: contrasting the EU and US approaches to the re-sale of second-hand digital objects’ 
(2013) 35(8) EIPR 487-490; T.-E. Synodinou, ‘The principle of technological neutrality in European 
copyright law: myth or reality?’ (2012) 34(9) EIPR 618-627; E. F. Schulze, ‘Resale of digital content 
such as music, films or ebooks under European Law’ (2014) 36(1) EIPR 9-13; See also Aleksandrs 
Ranks and Jurijs Vasiļevičs v Finanšu un ekonomisko noziegumu izmeklēšanas prokoratūra and Microsoft Corp. 
(C-166/15) EU:C:2016:762, where the Court of Justice held that “Article 4(a) and (c) and Article 5(1) 
and (2) of Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer 
programs must be interpreted as meaning that, although the initial acquirer of a copy of a computer 
program accompanied by an unlimited user licence is entitled to resell that copy and his licence to a 
new acquirer, he may not, however, in the case where the original material medium of the copy that 
was initially delivered to him has been damaged, destroyed or lost, provide his back-up copy of that 
program to that new acquirer without the authorisation of the rightholder.” 
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included in the Computer Programs Directive,85 and there is a very restrictive 
position also taken in the Allposters case.86 
Although bearing a similar effect, Svensson does not introduce exhaustion.87 This 
case—although not expressly stating it—echoes an implied licence rationale. An 
implied license is often seen as a declaration of intent:88 a particular conduct may be 
deemed lawful where rightholders have created the impression that third parties 
acting in good faith are implicitly authorised to carry out an otherwise infringing 
activity. Although of minor significance when it was first developed, the implied 
license doctrine became more relevant with digitisation and the internet, owing to 
the common perception that internet users have wider access to openly available 
content and rightholders are expected to be familiar with the particularities of this 
environment when deciding to upload their materials freely online.89  
Different legal systems have developed a similar, yet distinct approach to implied 
licenses. In Anglo-American copyright, an activity will be considered as implicitly 
licensed if it falls within the scope of the initial authorisation. By contrast, the 
German approach is broader, as it also covers instances where the rightholders 
																																								 																				
85 Landgericht Bielefeld, 4 O 191/11, 5 March 2013; Oberlandesgericht Hamm, 22 U 60/13, 15 May 2014. 
86 Art & Allposters International BV v Stichting Pictoright (C-419/13) EU:C:2015:27; also see Opinion of 
AG Cruz EU:C:2014:2214. 
87  See contra, ALAI Opinion of 17 September 2014; J. Rosén, ‘Chapter 12: How Much 
Communication to the Public Is 'Communication to the Public'?’ in Irini A. Stamatoudi, New 
Developments in EU and International Copyright Law, Info Law Series, Volume 35 (Alphen aan den Rijn, 
Kluwer Law International: 2016) 331 – 350. 
88  G. Spindler, ‘Bildersuchmaschinen, schranken und konkludente einwilligung im urheberrecht. 
Besprechung der BGH-Entscheidung ‘Vorschaubilder’’, 9 Gewerblicher Rechtsschuz und 
Urheberrecht 789-791, 2010, cited in T. Pihlajarinne, 702. Also see A. Cruquenaire, ‘Electronic agents 
as search engines: copyright-related aspects’ (2001) 9 IJL&IT 327, 334 et seq. 
89 T. Pihlajarinne, ‘Setting the limits for the implied license in copyright and linking discourse – the 
European perspective’ (2012) 43(6) IIC 700-710, at 701. 
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failed to take positive steps to ensure that an activity remains prohibited.90 For 
instance, in cases involving content made available online by the relevant 
rightholders and crawled by search engines without authorisation, German Courts 
found that rightholders had given their implied consent for these works to be made 
available in online searches. This was either because they had not applied technical 
measures to prevent crawling, i.e. the systematic browsing and copying of web 
pages for purpose of indexing and search,91 or because they had optimised their 
website to attract more users.92  
Svensson seems to affirm that rightholders cannot have a viable claim of 
infringement, unless they have taken active steps, such as access restriction 
mechanisms, in delimiting the circle of potential recipients of a communication. 
This does not cover the act of communication as such but its intended recipients at 
a certain point in time.93 It is not truly a “waiver erga omnes”. Even if rightholders 
make their works available freely online at some point in time, they may later 
change their mind and those accessing the work freely could become a new public.  
																																								 																				
90 It can be said that the Anglo-American approach is to interpret the possibility of an implied license 
positively, i.e. as broadening the scope of initial authorisation, whereas the German approach is based 
on a negative construal, i.e. what has not been prohibited will be included within the scope of the 
license.  
91 Bundesgerichtshof, 19 October 2011, I ZR 140/10 (Vorschaubilder II) (Germany); Alain Strowel and 
Vicky Hanley, ‘Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringement with regard to Hyperlinks’, in Alain 
Strowel (ed), Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and Secondary Liability in Copyright Law (Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, 
2008), at 88.  
92 Court of Appeal of Jena (Oberlandesgericht Jena), 2 U 319/07, 27 February 2008, Kommunikation 
und Recht 2008, 301 (Germany); also see Bundesgerichtshof, 12 May 2010, I ZR 121/08 (Sommer unseres 
Lebens) (Germany); Bundesgerichtshof, 11 March 2009, I ZR 114/06 (Halzband) (Germany). 
93 Since hyperlinking will be unlawful if the rightholders apply restriction measures ex post, it remains 
to be seen what the implications on this ruling will be. Will this introduce, for instance, an indefinite 
obligation to “monitor” hyperlinking by cross-referring to the original source? E. Arezzo, ‘Hyperlinks 
and making available right in the European Union – what future for the Internet after Svensson?’ 
(2014) 45(5) IIC 524-555, 543-548.  
	 25 
This effect of the Svensson case is more akin to an affirmation of an implied license 
than copyright exhaustion. Indeed, the Court of Justice itself seems to align to such 
reasoning in GS Media.94 Referring to Svensson and Bestwater, the Court held that: 
“as soon as and as long as that work is freely available on the website to which 
the hyperlink allows access, it must be considered that, where the copyright 
holders of that work have consented to such a communication, they have 
included all internet users as the public…”95 
This did not seem to apply to GS Media, however. Unlike Svensson and BestWater, 
the content was available without the consent of the rightholders. GS Media 
published an article, including part of a photograph and ending with the following 
words: ‘And now the link with the pics you’ve been waiting for.’ By clicking on a 
hyperlink, readers were directed to an Australian data-storage website called 
Filefactory.com, on which another hyperlink allowed them to download a file in zip 
format containing 11 files in pdf format, each of which contained one of Sanoma’s 
photographs. GS Media refused to remove the hyperlink in question, despite 
Sanoma’s demands, and later on they published two further articles featuring new 
hyperlinks to Dekker's photographs. Sanoma was successful in their claims before 
the Amsterdam District Court and the Amsterdam Court of Appeal. The Dutch 
Supreme Court stayed proceedings and referred a number of questions relating to 
the lawfulness of hyperlinks to the Court of Justice.  
According to the Court of Justice, central in the finding of infringement of the 
communication right was the profit-making nature of the activity, as a determinant 
																																								 																				
94 GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV, Playboy Enterprises International Inc., Britt Geertruida Dekker 
(GS Media) (C‑160/15) EU:C:2016:644. 
95 Ibid at [42]. 
	 26 
factor in establishing that the website had knowledge of the infringing activity.96 As 
the Court noted, it cannot be inferred either from Svensson or from BestWater that 
posting, on a website, hyperlinks to protected works which have been made freely 
available on another website, but without the consent of the copyright holders of 
those works, would be excluded from the concept of communication to the public 
within the meaning of article 3(1) of the Information Society Directive.97 Rather, 
those decisions confirm the importance of such consent under that provision, as 
the latter specifically provides that every act of communication of a work to the 
public is to be authorised by the copyright holder.98 Interestingly, the Court also 
stressed that if there is no new public, there will be no communication to the 
“public” where the works to which those hyperlinks allow access have been made 
freely available on another website with the consent of the rightholder. Indeed, in 
his Opinion, the AG stressed that:  
“the criterion of a new public is applicable only where the copyright holder has 
authorised the initial communication to the public. Since there is no such 
authorisation in the main proceedings, the criterion of a ‘new public’ is not 
applicable.”99 
What makes the new public really «new»? 
																																								 																				
96	The GS Media reasoning was upheld in a Swedish case: Rebecka Jonsson v Les Éditions de l’Avenir S.A., 
Attunda Tingsrätt, 13 October 2016.	
97 See, however, the position of AG Wathelet on this matter at [88], according to whom: 
 “Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 must be interpreted as meaning that a hyperlink to another 
website on which works protected by copyright are freely accessible to the public, which 
facilitates or simplifies users’ access to the works in question, does not constitute a 
‘communication to the public’ within the meaning of that provision.”   
98 GS Media at [43]. 
99 Ibid at [67].  
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The concept of the new public judicially frames the limits of the communication 
right towards a principle-based approach, centred around the very exploitative 
nature of the right. What the “new” public does is to further our understanding of 
the communication right by developing a doctrinal interpretation of its appropriate 
scope. It restricts and expands the scope of online copyright infringement at the 
same time, and in this light it fundamentally changes the scope of the right, serving 
as a doctrinal filter in assessing infringement.  
Whereas an unauthorised communication on its own will likely amount to 
infringement if it needs to be subject to separate authorisation, the finding that no 
new public was involved will serve as a defence. There will be no new public either 
because the communication in question does not need to be separately and 
individually authorised by the rightholders or because the circle of recipients 
reached by an unauthorised activity has implicitly been licensed by the relevant 
rightholders. This is, for instance, what Svensson instructs. At the same time, a 
communication reaching a circle of persons exceeding the audience originally 
targeted by the relevant rightholders is likely to be infringement, irrespective of the 
fact that it took place under the same technical means with the original 
communication. This is because it is assumed that the authorisation given does not 
only cover the act of communication as such but it also restricts the audience it is 
meant to reach. This was, to an extent, the case in Rafael and FA Premier League. 
The challenging aspect in Svensson is not the twist in the interpretation of the new 
public requirement as an inappropriate limit to the communication right;100 what is 
truly controversial is that hyperlinking was found to amount to an act of 
																																								 																				
100 According to the ALAI in its Opinion of 17 September 2014, the new public requirement is in 
conflict with arts 11(1)(ii), 11bis(1), 11ter(1)(ii), 14(1) and 14bis(1), Berne Convention; art 8, WCT; arts 
2, 10, 14 and 15, WPPT; and, art 3, Information Society Directive. 
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communication, despite the fact that placing hyperlinks arguably involves no actual 
transmission of content. This creates the impression that a de facto “exhaustion” 
rule applies, although this is not the case as there was no communication of content 
in the first place. As a bookstore assistant cannot be found liable for infringement 
of the distribution right by helping customers find a book on a shelf, hyperlinks 
should be exempt from infringement because there is no communication of the 
work. Yet, in any event, it is not the exhaustion principle that would potentially give 
hyperlinks immunity; it cannot apply to every act of hyperlinking because not all of 
them are equally “innocent” and there are kinds of hyperlinks that may entail the 
retransmission of content. What would have offered a viable criterion, however, 
would have been a clarification of what an actionable communication entails. 
It is in this light that reliance on the new public requirement may result in 
unnecessary complexity and legal uncertainty. Although the economic rationale 
underpinning the new public requirement is part of a principle-based approach, 
featuring in similar cases involving other exclusive rights, Svensson makes reference 
to the new public requirement taking off from a dubious premise, namely that 
hyperlinks amount to an act of communication. It is the reasoning of the decision 
that is controversial, not its outcome. In this light, the complicated logic of the new 
public requirement challenges the credibility of the law, as satellite conditions ought 
to be inserted in the test of infringement, e.g. the requirement of the “same 
technical means”. 101  This may lead to unpredictable outcomes, in that the 
indeterminate body of internet users is in principle a far larger circle of recipients 
than residents of hotel bedrooms or a pub’s clientele. Unlike what happens in the 
borderless web, the spatial element of an establishment delimits the use ab initio, no 
																																								 																				
101ALAI, Opinion of 17 September 2014, at 2. 
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matter the fact that it is open to the general public. The test for infringement is, 
hence, not based on a simple rule that would match sensible user expectations and 
it becomes difficult to tell which communications amount to infringement or not. 
This generates unnecessary legal uncertainty, challenging the credibility and the 
legitimacy of EU copyright law. 
The “same old” public? 
The complicated logic of the new public requirement could be overcome if 
reference was made to specific sets of users who do not fall under the public the 
rightholders had in mind when authorising the initial communication. From a 
principle-based perspective, there are two kinds of audiences that do not fall under 
the authorial public. First, there are private users and, secondly, there are those who 
have gained lawful access to the content with the express or implied authorisation 
of the rightholders. In both these instances, economic considerations are 
paramount: private users are those to whom the rightholders cannot have a 
reasonable expectation of licensing further copies of works and lawful users are 
those who have already bought or gained lawful access to the copies. Although 
bearing the same legal result, these kinds of users differ in one central aspect: lawful 
users are part of the public but they have already received authorisation, and private 
users do not need to receive authorisation, as they are not part of the public in the 
first place.102  
Lawful users are not a new public 
																																								 																				
102 Digital communications seem to challenge this assumption to a large extent. As Ginsburg has 
observed in 95/6 Colum. L. Rev., 1995, at 1477-78: “the entire concept of 'private copying' makes little 
sense in a world where the work is predominantly marketed directly to the end users[,] . . . and the 
market for, or 'normal exploitation of,' the work will by and large be the private copying market.” 
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The owners of a copyright work, or those who have lawfully purchased access to it 
are the public that the authors had in mind when authorising a specific use. Issuing 
copies of a protected work to these lawful owners or possessors cannot amount to 
infringement. This has been affirmed in the FA Premier League case, where it was 
stressed that when authors authorise a broadcast of their works, they take into 
account solely the owners of TV sets who, either personally or within their own 
private or family circles, receive the signal and follow the broadcasts. The public 
that the authors have in mind when authorising the transmission consists primarily 
of those having a lawful entitlement over the communication, either because they 
have bought the work or gained access to the content by the original rightholders 
or authorised parties. It would be only when the specific act of communication 
exceeds this public that an additional circle of recipients is reached and hence 
authorisation is necessary. 
The same principle can also be found in US jurisprudence. In Aereo,103 for instance, 
the question was whether a technologically complex service allowing its subscribers 
to watch television programs over the Internet amounts to an act of public 
performance within the meaning of §101 of the US Copyright Act. Because 
performances were capable of being perceived by one and only one subscriber at a 
time, Aereo denied allegations of infringement, arguing that the transmission did 
not reach the public. Although there is no definition of “the public” in the US 
Copyright Act, same as under EU copyright law, it is there specified that an entity 
performs protected works publicly when it does so at “any place where a substantial 
number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social 
acquaintances is gathered.” This was not found to be the case in Aereo. The 
																																								 																				
103 American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. et al, Petitioners v Aereo, Inc., FKA Bamboom Labs, Inc., 573 U. S. 
____ (2014) 1. 
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Supreme Court held that Aereo communicated the same contemporaneously 
perceptible images and sounds to a large number of people who were unrelated and 
unknown to each other. What is more, the Supreme Court stressed that the 
“public” does not need to be situated together, spatially or temporally. It was thus 
held that Aereo transmitted a performance of the protected works to the public, as 
per the so-called transmit clause.104  
Drawing further insights on the concept of the “public”, the Supreme Court 
defined it to mean “a group of individuals acting as ordinary members of the public 
who pay primarily to watch broadcast television programs, many of which are 
copyrighted.”105 What the Supreme Court found was that the question whether a set 
of persons qualifies as “public” often depends upon their relationship to the 
underlying work. In explaining this point, they gave the example of a valet parking 
attendant; returning cars to their owners was not an offer “to the public”. This is 
not the case, however, with a car dealer who sells cars to persons lacking a pre-
existing relationship to the cars and who can reach the public at large.106 An analogy 
was therefore drawn to an entity that transmits a performance to individuals acting 
as owners or possessors, which is not addressed “to the public”, and other 
operators, like Aereo, that transmit performances to a large number of paying 
																																								 																				
104 See ibid at 14. The transmit clause (17 U.S.C. Section 101) defines public performance as follows: 
“To transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work . . . to 
the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public 
capable or receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in 
separate places and at the same time or at different times.” 
105 Ibid at 16. 
106 Ibid. 
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subscribers lacking a pre-existing relationship to the works.107 These subscribers 
would qualify as a new public under European law.108  
In excluding lawful users from the concept of the public, it is important to stress 
that these are not only those who have actually purchased the protected works, or 
those benefiting from a particular exception or limitation,109 but also those who 
have gained access to those works from the rightholders or with their consent. This 
is the case with content made available online with no access restrictive 
mechanisms in place, as in Svensson and Bestwater.110 Lawful users are hence those 
having received express authorisation and those who have been given free access to 
the works from the rightholders, such as through an implied licence.  
Private users  
Because infringement occurs when unauthorised communication of works reaches 
the public, certain activities that are carried out within a private circle may be 
excluded from infringement. This typically includes the immediate family and the 
closest social acquaintances.111 In drawing the line between private and public uses, 
the distinction heavily depends on qualitative considerations, including—but not 
limited to—commercial or economic factors. One of the leading questions is 
																																								 																				
107 Ibid at 15. 
108 It ought to be noted that the relationship between the user and the work under EU law is more 
nuanced, as the mere fact that a user owns a copy of a work is immaterial if a subsequent 
communication of the same work in a different format takes place. See in this regard the ITV case.  
109 See, e.g., Public Relations Consultants Association Ltd v Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd and Others 
(C‑360/13), EU:C:2014:1195 at [59]. 
110 Even in cases where access protection is enabled, there are policy reasons why users of content 
services should benefit from unfettered access within the borders of the EEA, as the phenomenon of 
geo-blocking indicates. See in this respect the Digital Single Market strategy, 6 May 2015.  
111 See in this regard the WIPO Glossary of 2003 on the concept of the “public”; see also Commission 
of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Paper on the review of the EC legal 
framework in the field of copyright and related rights, SEC(2004) 995, 19 July 2004, 15.  
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whether rightholders can have a reasonable expectation to sell, or license access to, 
more than one copy of their works to a private set of users. It is not clear, however, 
whether the newly developed doctrine of the new public impacts on the 
permissibility of private uses and, if so, to what extent. With the prominence given 
to the new public factor in considerations of infringement, it is likely that the 
distinction between private and public audiences is no longer fully reliable.  
The problems in the private/public distinction lie in cases where an audience 
qualifies neither as abstractly public nor as private.112 Essential in drawing the line 
here is the relationship that those initiating the transmission, or the rightholders, 
have with these users, rather than the relationship of the users with the work.113 The 
determinant factor is whether the communication reaches a portion of the public 
that was not envisaged by the rightholders when authorising an act of 
communication. It is a matter of doctrinal interpretation to assess how a particular 
factual background affects the classification of the public involved, and because the 
central point of assessment on the basis of statutes is the public, it is sufficient for 
an audience to simply not qualify as such. 
Such a question was discussed in Del Corso:114 was a dentist playing background 
music in his practice liable for infringement for broadcasting protected subject-
matter to the public? The fourth question on which the Corte d’Appello di Torino 
sought clarification was whether the free-of-charge broadcasting of phonograms 
																																								 																				
112 See e.g. American Broadcasting, 573 U. S. ____ (2014), 14. See also in this regard Circul Globus Bucureşti 
(Circ & Variete Globus Bucureşti) v Uniunea Compozitorilor şi Muzicologilor din România - Asociaţia pentru 
Drepturi de Autor (UCMR - ADA) (C‑283/10) EU:C:2011:772 at [40] and [41]. 
113 S. Karapapa, Private Copying (London: Routledge, 2012) 65 et seq. 
114 Del Corso (C‑135/10) EU:C:2012:140. 
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within dental practices engaged in professional economic activity constitutes public 
communication within article 3(2)(b) of the Information Society Directive. 
The Court stressed that there was an intentional communication through the 
deliberate intervention of the dentist and that the audience was not merely “caught 
by chance” in listening to phonograms,115 but asked whether such a communication 
was addressed to the public. As the Court acknowledged, the public 
communication right contained in article 3(1) of the Information Society Directive 
“refers to an indeterminate number of potential listeners, and, in addition, implies a 
fairly large number of persons”.116 Explaining the “indeterminate” nature of the 
public, the Court referred to the interpretative guidance offered in the WIPO 
glossary, which defines the concept of public communication as:  
“making a work … perceptible in any appropriate manner to persons in 
general, that is, not restricted to specific individuals belonging to a private 
group”.117  
The number of individuals to which such a communication is addressed matters, 
but there is a certain de minimis threshold to be assumed, i.e. one excluding from the 
concept “groups of persons which are too small, or insignificant”.118 A dentist’s 
clientele is not large or significant because the patients have appointments one at a 
time and because it is unlikely that they listen to the same phonograms. They are 
also a “very consistent group of persons and thus constitute a determinate circle of 
																																								 																				
115 Ibid at [93] and [94]. See also Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace - Svaz softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo 
kultury (C-393/09) EU:C:2010:816. 
116 Del Corso at [84]. See also Mediakabel (C‑89/04) at [30]; Lagardère (C‑192/04) at [31]; and, Rafael 
Hoteles (C-306/05) at [37] and [38]. 
117 Del Corso at [85]. 
118 Ibid at [86]. 
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potential recipients”.119 Hence the fact that they succeed each other does not weigh 
heavily. 120  Finally, it was stressed that, unlike pubs and hotels, broadcasting 
phonograms in a dental practice does not impact its standing and financial benefits 
in that the dentist cannot expect a rise in the number of patients because of that 
broadcast alone, or charge a higher price for his service.121 This latter point, along 
with the fact that Del Corso was a case on neighbouring rights, 122 marks the 
difference from the public involved in hotel rooms and public houses.  
The Del Corso case is a rather relevant precedent for cases where there is a 
communication in public that does not amount to a communication to the public 
and hence to infringement. The grounds for acquitting such a use from 
infringement rest on the lack of public character and profit-making purpose in the 
use.123  
Conclusion 
The requirement that there ought to be a communication to a new public for 
infringement to be established is an autonomous concept of EU copyright law. 
Limited by the specificity of the cases that have been brought before the Court, this 
newly developed doctrinal condition has profound implications on the scope of 
copyright infringement on the internet. It can both expand and restrict the confines 
of the communication right, essentially shaping it in directions that were not 
foreseen when the right was first introduced. It is no longer a new, unauthorised act 
																																								 																				
119 Ibid at [95]. 
120 Ibid at [96]. 
121 Ibid at [97]. 
122 Ibid at [74]-[77]; also OSA v Léčebné lázně Mariánské Lázně a.s.  (C-351/12) at [35].  
123 This seems to be an enlarged version of the private copying defence found in art 5(2)(b) 
Information Society Directive, according to which reproductions made for private use and a non-
profit purpose are exempt from infringement.  
	 36 
of communication to the public that amounts to infringement, there must also be a 
further communication of the work addressed to a new public.  
This doctrinal shift of the focus on the assessment of infringement does not work 
well in all cases and can lead to unpredictable outcomes. National Courts have 
already started applying the new public requirement reaching a variety of 
outcomes124 and the number of referrals to the Court of Justice for clarification is 
growing.125 It can be read, for instance, as introducing an implied license argument 
in cases where rightholders have made content freely available online, in that 
hyperlinking or framing from third parties does not reach a new public and is hence 
beyond the control of the relevant rightholders. 
The ambiguity that surrounds the newly introduced test for assessing infringement 
of the communication right is perhaps to be attributed to the counterproductive 
and ill-construed scope of the communication right in the first place. The right has 
																																								 																				
124 “Viasat”, Supreme Court of Estonia, 3-2-1-50-13, 29 May 2013, (Estonia), (authors shall have no 
right to claim royalties from the satellite service provider if the broadcasting organisation has already 
paid royalties and no "new public" has being created as a result of providing satellite-TV services); 
Estonian Authors Society v AS Viasat, Tallinn Circuit Court, 2-11-17594, 28 February 2014, (Estonia), 
(encryption of TV signals and sale of decryption cards was not considered to be sufficient for 
establishing a “new public”); Paramount Home Entertainment International Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd 
[2013] EWHC 3479 (Ch), (UK), (mere provision of a hyperlink did not clearly fall under the scope of 
"communication to the public", however the combined effect of uploading content to a host site and 
providing a link did amount to such communication; the case thoroughly addressed the new public 
criterion); 1967 Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2014] EWHC 3444 (Ch), (UK), (there was copyright 
infringement by both UK users and operators of file-sharing websites, insofar as there was 
communication of copyright works, the communication was to the public, and the act of 
communication took place in the UK); “TV sets in hotel rooms”, Court of Appeal of Lisbon, 
163/14.8YHLSB.L1-6, 27 December 2014 (repeating Rafael); “Hotel rooms”, Supreme Court, 649/2013, 
9 April 2013, (Greece) (repeating Rafael); NSE v Stichting BREIN, Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, 
ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2014:3435, 19 August 2014, (Netherlands), (the new public was used as a defence 
by a Usenet service provider but it was not upheld by the Court). 
125  See, indicatively, Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden 
(Netherlands) lodged on 18 November 2015 — Stichting Brein, Other parties: Ziggo BV and XS4ALL 
Internet BV (C-610/15); Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Midden-Nederland 
(Netherlands) lodged on 5 October 2015 — Stichting Brein v Jack Frederik Wullems, currently trading under 
the name Filmspeler (C-527/15); Opinion of AG Wathelet on GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands 
BV, Playboy Enterprises International Inc., Britt Geertruida Dekker (C‑160/15). 
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an extremely broad scope and overlaps with the reproduction right, in the sense 
that acts of communication often involve copying. Even in the limited instances 
where this is not the case, as with certain types of hyperlink, the right can still be 
infringed. If, however, every act of communication is to be infringement and there 
are no defining criteria as to what amounts to an actionable communication, 
essential functions of the online environment and user freedom are significantly 
curtailed. Although it would be clear and unambiguous to say that every 
unauthorised act of communication to the public amounts to infringement, such a 
broad construal is unworkable and could have the dangerous effects of the broadly 
defined reproduction right, which has to be read in conjunction with its various 
limitations for its scope to be properly understood.  
This is not to say that the multifaceted requirement of the new public in and of 
itself is appropriate in assessing what an actionable communication is, as it lacks the 
clarity and simplicity that makes good law. Its complexity—mainly because of its 
dependence on a number of additional conditions, all of which have a doctrinal 
standing but do not expressly feature in statutory language—challenges the 
credibility and legitimacy of copyright, which does not seem to align with 
reasonable user expectations for simple, understandable rules.  
Despite the uncertainty that comes with it, the requirement of the new public urges 
for the rethinking of the appropriate scope of the otherwise extremely broad 
communication right and invites a principle-based approach in examinations of 
infringement by shedding the focus on one of the essential internal constituents of 
the right, without which no act of copyright exploitation can achieve its primary 
purpose: the public. 
	 38 
Uncertainty related to the new public requirement could be overcome if reference 
was made to sets of users that fall outside the authorial public to which 
communications are addressed, e.g. lawful users and private circles. For such circles 
of users, content retransmission cannot be new, hence, not impacting on 
exploitation, i.e. the main objective the right aims to achieve.  
